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Modelling Corruption in a Cobb-Douglas 





In this paper, we extend the Solow growth model to include corruption as a 
determinant of the multifactor productivity using a Cobb-Douglas production function 
framework. In addition to the classical components of any growth model (output, labor, 
capital), we incorporate corruption as a determinant of government expenditure, 
investment and foreign aid. It is proposed that output and growth are influenced by the 
level of corruption. This model is to be tested empirically to trace the corruptive 
behaviour in Lebanon based on the available time series data. 




The body of theoretical and empirical research on corruption has grown 
considerably in recent years (Elliot 1997; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Gill 1998; Girling 1997; 
HDC 1999; Kaufmann and Sachs 1998; Mauro 1995; Paul and Guhan 1997; Shleifer and 
Vishnay 1993; Stapenhurst and Kpundeh 1999; Vittal 1999; World Bank 1997). A 
preliminary analysis of the literature shows that corruption is recognised as a complex 
phenomenon, as the consequence of more deep seated problems of policy distortion, 
institutional incentives and governance. It thus cannot be addressed by simple legal acts 
proscribing corruption. In this paper, we explore several theories and models that 
explicitly incorporate the potential impact of corruption on output via the indirect effects 
of corruption on the arguments of the production function. Then, we present a model that 
will be used to measure the impact of corruption on economic growth in Lebanon. The 
focus will be on mathematical derivations, data sources, model extensions, limitations,   3
and estimation techniques. Further, we will develop the empirical framework, and specify 
the estimation equations that will be used for our analysis. We then discuss the challenges 
and opportunities of employing the available data prior to conclusion. 
 
2. Literature review 
The old myth that corruption by its “intrinsic nature” is impossible to measure 
delayed the emergence of serious empirical analysis of corruption. There is a consensus 
that real magnitude of corruption cannot be measured. Nonetheless, the obvious 
difficulties in measuring corruption have not kept a number of entrepreneurs, multilateral 
development banks, and academics from attempting to do so. Conceptually, it is often 
difficult to accept the many limitations of the various measures of corruption. All widely 
used 'scientific' methods in the field of corruption evaluation hold value in achieving the 
goal, that is, to estimate the spread and map the structure of corruption. First, the general 
perception can be, and is regularly used as a sensitive core indicator of the feeling the 
'lack of justice' in public transactions (Akerlof 1985). On the other hand, the incidence-
based approach is more independent from media agenda, and the general sense of society. 
Finally, in the most cited and probably respected cross-country comparison of the 
“Transparency International Framework”, corruption was primarily based on expert 
evaluation. The approach taken now is to transform the computation of corruption 
perception index (CPI), as a common index derived from different general polls and 
expert interviews (Knack 1995, Murphy 1993, Bardhan 1997, and Mandapaka 1995). In 
general, experience-based indicators appear to offer the greatest potential for 
comparability, since they avoid some of the problems associated with perception-based 
indicators. 
Corruption is often modelled as a principal – agent problem. A principal delegates 
some decision power to an agent, where the principal’s rules of preference in exercising 
the power are known to the agent, and the principal’s problem is that the agent may serve 
his/her own interests rather than the principal’s (Bardhan 1997). The literature also 
contains several different approaches that have been used in modeling corruption. The   4
influence of corruption on economic growth has been modelled using economic growth 
models (Krueger 1974; Murphy 1993; Mandapaka 1995; Mauro 1995). In addition, 
corruption has been modelled using the game theoretic approach with three players: 
principle, agent, and hidden principal (Andvig 1990; Laffont 1991; Basu 1992; 
Mookherjee 1995; Acemoglu 2000). In addition, Swarm, as programming language, has 
been widely used (Turnovsky 1995; Jain 1998; Stapenhurst 1999) to simulate corruption 
models, and analyse the dynamic and evolutionary process of corruption on various 
parameters. Falling short of empirical evidence and profound experience, there is not 
even a theory available that may potentially assist in putting the various approaches into 
comparative perspective. The table below summarises the previous approaches used in 
modeling corruption: 
Table 1  Previous models of corruption 
 
Approach Scholars  Models Methods  Limitations  Findings 
Economic 
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As indicated in table 1, every approach has strengths and weaknesses. Different 
models (Lucas type, Keynesian, Agent-based …) and methods (OLS, 2 stage LS,   5
MLE…) have been used. Only few who used the economic growth approach were able to 
empirically support the negative relationship between corruption and growth. This may 
be due to the endogeneity bias, subjective surveys and sample size sensitivity. On the 
other hand, although utilizing the game theory yields some useful insights into the notion 
of corruption, this approach ignores government involvement, models only the demand 
side of corruption, and involves one stage game while corruption occurs in continuing 
relationships. As for the MIMIC, where the output is a time-series index that can be used 
to construct ordinal and cardinal time series of corruption, this model lacks structural 
interdependence in addition to co-linearity between indicators. Finally, simulation models 
showed the strength of the cause-effect relationship between corruption and growth, but 
could not detect unstable equilibrium, and the total convergence was not achieved in 
finite time. 
The economic growth approach has the ability to test the relationship between 
economic growth and corruption, but its main limitation lies in using the correct index of 
corruption in the objective function. Most of indexes of corruption that have been used 
(Mauro 1995, Knack 1995, Murphy 1993, Bardhan 1997, and Mandapaka 1995) were 
based on surveys. These indexes reflect either the general perception of the people on the 
level of corruption present in the country or the expertise perception, and they both fail to 
reflect the actual level of corruption present in the country. The current literature on the 
impact of corruption lacks a theoretical framework that incorporates the potential effect 
of corruption on output through its impact on the arguments to the production function. 
Nor does it address the effect of corruption through its impact on economic growth and 
development. The literature to date, has only examined the hypothesised influences 
separately, ignoring the larger potential aggregate impact of corruption on output. While 
the potential influence of corruption on output is not one of the conventional arguments 
for anti-corruption efforts, ignoring this potential effect would inject a priori bias into the 
model.  
The key findings in the reviewed literature show a fragile negative relationship 
between corruption and economic growth (Mauro, 1995). However, many empirical 
findings proved that corruption discourages investment (Brunetti 1997), alters the   6
composition of government spending (Wei, 1997), reduces the effectiveness of foreign 
aid through diversion of funds (Alesina, 1999), creates loss of tax revenues and monetary 
problems leading to adverse budgetary consequences (Murphy, 1993), and is likely to 
produce certain composition of capital flows that makes a country more vulnerable to 
shifts in international investors' sentiments and expectations (Lambsdorff, 2000). 
Although, the damaging effects of corruption on investment and economic growth are 
widely recognized, corruption also has adverse effects on human development, and 
increases the cost of basic social services (Kaufman, 1998). Hence, our research 
examines this fragile negative relationship between corruption and growth in the case of 
the Lebanese economy. Specifically, we intend to answer some basic research questions, 
if a change in the level of corruption leads to a change in: 
•  The steady state level of output per worker 
•  The per capita rate of growth in output 
•  Output through reducing the effectiveness of government spending, foreign 
aid, and investment 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1 The basic model 
In response to the various shortcomings in the theoretical reviews, we develop a 
neoclassical model of economic growth that explicitly includes human capital 
accumulation and the direct and indirect effects of corruption on economic growth. The 
neoclassical growth modelling approach to the question of the impact of corruption on 
economic growth may be superior to previous studies employing a variety of approaches 
that ignore the potential indirect effect of corruption on economic growth and 
development. Our theoretical model suggests that output and growth are influenced by 
the level of corruption. If, as illustrated in the theoretical model, corruption influences 
growth, then if one of the physical inputs in the production function suffers a quality loss 
in the presence of corruption, then this will also affect growth and the steady state level   7
of output. We use of the work of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (MRW) (1992). This research 
extends the Solow model to include corruption as a determinant of the multifactor 
productivity which is the government expenditure in this case, since our operational 
definition of corruption in this paper is: the abuse of public power for private benefit. For 
simplicity, we will consider an economy that produces only one good. Output is produced 
with a well-behaved neoclassical production function with positive and strictly 
diminishing marginal product of physical capital. The Inada conditions assure that the 
marginal products of both capital and labor approach infinity as their values approach 
zero, and approach zero as their values go to infinity. The functional form of the 
production function is Cobb-Douglas: 
()
1
tt t t t YK HG L
α β αβ ρ
−−
= ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦          (1) 
where Yt is the aggregate level of real income, Kt is the level pf physical capital, 
Ht is the level of human capital, Lt is the amount of labor employed, Gt is the level of 
government expenditure, and ρ  is the level of corruption in the country, where 
'( ) 0 G ρ < . Let 0 < α <1, 0 < β <1 and α +β <1. These conditions ensure that the 
production function exhibits constant returns to scale and diminishing return to each 
point. Time is indexed by the continuous variable (t). With the omission of the corruption 
term, the model yields standard neoclassical results. That is, the growth rate of output per 
worker is accelerated with increases in investments in physical capital and decreases in 
population growth, depreciation rate of capital, and the initial level of output per worker. 
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where , , K HH SSδ and  K δ are parameters that represent, respectively, shares of 
income that are allocated to human and capital investment, and depreciation rate of 
human and physical capital. Moreover, population is exogenously determined and 
defined as  0
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Assuming full employment implies that labor force growth rate is also given by n. 
Solving for the steady state reduced equation reveals: 
0 ln( ) ln( ) [ (1 )]ln[ ( )] [ 1 ]ln[ ( )] ( ) tt k k H H t YL G g t S n g S n g G α αβ δ β αβ δ ρ =+ + − − + + + − − + + +  (4) 
As equation (4) reveals, steady state output per worker is an increasing function of 
initial level of government expenditure and its growth rate, physical and human savings 
and government expenditure. An expression for the growth of output per worker can also 
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   (5) 
As before, since increase in corruption reduces government expenditure, upward 
movements in corruption have an inverse relationship with growth of output per worker. 
However, with the omission of the corruption term, equation (5) yields the standard 
neoclassical results. That is, the growth rate of output per worker is accelerated with 
increases in investments in physical and human capital and decreases in population 
growth, depreciation rate of capital, and initial level of output per worker. In an effort to 
model the effect of corruption on multifactor productivity, a structural form for 
multifactor productivity will be assumed. Schleifer (1993) and Mandapaka (1995) show 
that the effect of corruption on the economy is nonlinear and bounded by a corrupt-free 
output and a subsistence level of output. Since every government agent in an economy 
will not leave the productive sector to become corrupt, some level of output will be 
produced. To allow for specificity in the government expenditure function, let 
  () t t GG e
γρ ρ
− =           (6) 
where01 ρ ≤≤ , and    
0
gt
t GG e =         (7) 
The parameterρ  is the index of corruption that we will use.γ determines the 
magnitude of the effect of corruption on government expenditure. Conventional 
government expenditure  
t G  is exogenous and grows at rate g. We assume that 0
t dG
dρ






> . Equation (6) shows that if there is no corruption(0 ) ρ = , then  
tt GG = . The 
same holds true for 0 γ = . Since corruption does not affect all production function in the 
same way, a higher value of γ increases the effect of corruption. Ceteris Paribus, as 
γ approaches zero, the corruption function approaches unity and output is maximized. 
Equations (1), (2), and (3) can be expressed in intensive form: 
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tt t ye k h
















δ =− + +         (10) 
where y=Y/L, k=K/L, h=H/L,    *
tt t yy G = (output per worker per government 
expenditure),    *
tt t kk G = (physical capital per worker per government expenditure) and 
  *
tt t hh G = (human capital per worker per government expenditure). At the steady state, 
equations (9) and (10) are equal to zero. Thus, setting them to zero, Equations (8), (9) and 
(10) become a system of three equations in three unknowns. The steady state levels of 
physical and human capital are as follows: 
*( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) [ ( )] [ ( )] tK k H H ks n g s n g e
β αβ β αβ γ ρ δδ
−− − − −− =+ + + +      (11) 
* ( )( 1 ) ( 1 )( 1 ) [( ) ] [( ) ] tK k H H hs n g sn g e
α αβ α αβ γ ρ δδ
−− − −− − =+ + + +      (12) 
Substituting (11) and (12) into (8) results in a steady state equation for output per 
worker: 
*( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) [ ( )] [ ( )] tK k H H ys n g s n g e
α αβ β αβ γ ρ δδ
−− −− − =+ + + +      (13) 
Recall that   * () ttt t yY G L = . Substituting this into equation (13), multiplying by 
 
t G and taking natural logs yields: 
0 ln( ) ln( ) [ (1 )]ln[ ( )]
[( 1 ) ] l n [ ( ) ]
tt K K
HH
YL G g t s n g
sn g
α αβ δ
βα β δ γ ρ
=+ + − − + +
+− − + + −
     (14)   10
For simplicity, let us assume that human capital and physical capital depreciate at 
the same rate (δ ). Employing that assumption yields: 
0 ln( ) ln( ) [( ) (1 )]ln( )
[( 1 ) ] l n () [( 1 ) ] l n ()
tt
KH
YL G g t n g
ss
α βα β δ
αα β βα β γ ρ
=+ − + − − + +
+− − +− − −
     (15) 
  Equation (15) shows that steady state output per worker is increasing in initial 
level of multifactor productivity, the trend term (gt) and its growth, and physical and 
capital investment rates. Higher initial levels of multifactor productivity increases steady 
state output per worker and the higher the growth rate of multifactor the higher the steady 
state output per worker, as well. The investment rates work themselves through equations 
(11) and (12). Higher investment rates increase the levels of physical and human capital 
per worker, which then increases output per worker through equation (8). 
  Output per worker, however, is decreasing in capital per worker depreciation 
() ng δ ++ and corruption. The effect of corruption depends on the value ofγ . A positive 
value of γ  means that corruption is output debilitating while a negative value causes 
corruption to be output enhancing. A value of zero reduces the steady state output level 
equation to that of MRW. The effect of corruption on a country’s steady state level and 
economic growth is depicted in Appendix A. An increase in corruption reduces the 
productivity of capital by rotating the production function to the right. At the point A, the 
initial level of capital stock per worker (k0) cannot be maintained and the economy moves 
to a lower level of capital stock per worker (k1). In this process, the economy faces 
negative growth as it moves to (k1) along with a reduced level of output per worker. 
3.2 Convergence to the steady state 
In keeping with MRW, approximating around the steady state level of output can 
derive the speed of convergence to steady state. The speed of convergence is represented 
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where ( )(1 ) ng λ δα β =+ + − −. To find a solution to equation (16), we can 
rewrite this as [( ) ln ] (ln )
tt s s
tt ed y d t ye y
λλ λ
−− +=  which leads to: 
0 ln (1 )ln (1 )ln
ts s t
t ye y e y
λλ −− =− −−         (17) 
where y0 is the initial level of output of the economy. Subtracting left and right 
hand sides of equation (17) by ln y
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  (18) 
Since the speed of convergence ( ) λ is a constant, equation (18) states that 
economic growth is a function of the initial level of multifactor productivity and its 
growth rate, population growth rate, physical and human capital investment rates, the 
level of corruption and the initial level of output. As before, the trivial conditions are the 
positive relationships between the time trend and the initial level of technology. 
Additionally, the traditional Solow Neoclassical results are present with this model. 
There is a negative effect of exogenous parameters such as population growth and 
depreciation rate. Conditional convergence is captured with the negative relationship 
between initial level of output and the level of economic growth. 
Corruption reduces economic growth by acting as an offsetting force to the 
efficiencies obtained through improvements in multifactor productivity. Corruption 
reduces the effectiveness of physical and human capital and output per worker. Lower 
levels of output necessitate a lower level of investments since investment rates 
(&) K H ss are fixed. This will result in a lower level of investment that further contributes 
to lower levels of output. Hence, there is a negative effect on the growth of output per 
worker. As with the level equation (15), note that the sign of gamma determines if 
corruption is either output enhancing or output-debilitating. A positive gamma produces a 
negative effect on multifactor productivity while a negative gamma produces output-
enhancing results. For consistency, a zero value of gamma reduces equation (18) to that 
of MRW. An inherent contribution of equations (15) and (18) is that they can be tested   12
directly using OLS. To do so, certain normality and other assumptions must be made 
about the data and the way they were generated. 
3.3 Model extensions 
As mentioned before, the model discussed above is designed to capture the effect 
of corruption on economic growth via incorporating corruption with the multifactor 
productivity in a Cobb-Douglas production function. This will capture the corruptive 
behaviour within government officials in allocating the government resources. But, those 
officials not only have control over the government’s expenditure, but also interfere in 
allocating resources (funds) coming from other sources such as international 
organizations (WB, IMF, UN, FAO, and UNDP), foreign governments, and other NGO’s 
in the form of a foreign aid or from the private sector as investments. Hence, our model 
can be modified to examine how the level of corruption slows the economic growth not 
only through reducing the government expenditure level, but also via affecting the level 
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Recall equation (6), and replace G (government expenditure) with F (foreign aid), 
then we have 
  ()
f
t t FF e
γ ρ ρ
− =           (21) 
Similarly,  ()
i
t t II e
γ ρ ρ
− = %         (22) 
f γ determines the magnitude of the effect of corruption on foreign aid, and i γ  
determines the magnitude of the effect of corruption on investment. Let us assume for 
now that the conventional foreign aid  
t F  and investment  
t I are exogenous and they grow 
at the rates f and I respectively ( 
0
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Therefore, in the same mathematical manipulations that produced equation (15), 
the following equations will be estimated using the data on foreign aid and investment, 
respectively: 
0 ln( ) ln( ) [( ) (1 )]ln( )
[( 1 ) ] l n () [( 1 ) ] l n ()
tt
KH f
YL F f t n f
ss
αβ αβ δ
αα β βα β γ ρ
=+ − + − − + +
+− − + − − −
   (23) 
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   (24) 
3.4 Estimation equations 
The base model of real GDP level without corruption will be used to estimate the 
elasticities of output (physical and human capital) using non-linear least squares as the 
estimating procedures in the following equation: 
01 2 3 4 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) tt t t t t GDP POP g INV EDU t β βδ β β βε =+ + ++ + + +    (25) 
The differences in time period, sample size and sample selection may lead to 
different results from that of MRW. To answer our first research question (does a change 
in the level of corruption lead to a change in the steady state level of output per worker), 
we will add the corruption variable to the base model, and estimate the following 
equations  
01 2 3 4 5 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) tt t t t t t GDP POP g INV EDU CORRUPTION t β βδ β β β βε =+ + ++ + + + +   (26) 
01 2 3 4 5 6 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) tt t t t t t t GDP POP g INV EDU CORRUPTION CORRUPTIONSQ t β βδ β β β β βε =+ + ++ + + + ++   (27) 
The results of the above equations will show evidence if a change in the level of 
corruption leads to a change in the steady state level of output per worker. Although 
adding CORRUPTIONSQ in equation (27) will create high collinearity with 
CORRUPTION, which increases the variances of their estimated coefficients, but this is 
only to check if the coefficient of CORRUPTIONSQ is statistically inferior or superior to 
that of CORRUPTION. Comparing the results of the base model (without corruption) 
with equations (26) and (27), we will have evidence if the corruption function does 
impact multifactor productivity and the production function; hence, we answer our   14
second research question (does a change in the level of corruption lead to a change in 
output through reducing the effectiveness of government expenditure). Similarly, 
equations (28), (29), (30), and (31) will be used to answer our third and fourth research 
questions respectively (does a change in the level of corruption lead to a change in output 
through reducing the effectiveness of investment, and foreign aid). 
01 2 3 4 5 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) tt t t t t t GDP POP f INV EDU CORRUPTION t β βδ β β β βε =+ + ++ + + ++   (28) 
01 2 3 4 5 6 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) tt t t t t t t GDP POP f INV EDU CORRUPTION CORRUPTIONSQ t β βδ β β β β βε =+ + ++ + + + ++   (29) 
01 2 3 4 5 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) tt t t t t t GDP POP i INV EDU CORRUPTION t β βδ β β β βε =+ + + + + + + +   (30) 
01 2 3 4 5 6 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) tt t t t t t t GDP POP i INV EDU CORRUPTION CORRUPTIONSQ t β βδ β β β β βε =+ + ++ + + + ++   (31) 
As for our fifth research question (does a change in the level of corruption lead to 
a change in the per capita rate of growth in output), the following equations (32) and (33) 
will be estimated, where the dependent variable will be the log difference of GDP per 
worker. 
00 1 2 3 4 50 ln ln ( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln tt t t t t t y y POP g INV EDU CORRUPTION y β βδ β β β β ε −= +++ + + + + +   (32) 
00 1 2 3 4 5 60 ln ln ( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln tt t t t t t t y y POP g INV EDU CORRUPTION CORRUPTIONSQ y ββ δ ββ β β β ε −= +++ + + + + + +   (33) 
Based on the results of estimating equations (32) and (33) in comparison with 
equation (25), we can have evidence if changing the level of corruption leads to a change 
in the per capita rate of growth in output 
 
3.5 Data 
The theoretical models (equations 15), (18), (23) and (24) contain parameters for 
corruption, investment rate for physical capital, the saving rate for human capital, 
population growth, the depreciation rate and multifactor productivity (government 
expenditure, foreign aid and investment). To proxy these variables, several sources are 
used. The corruption index from Political Risk Service’s International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) attempts to measure corruption by investigating whether high-ranking   15
government officials are likely to demand special payments and if illegal payments are 
generally expected in lower levels of government. These payments typically take the 
form of bribes connected with import-export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, 
police protection, or loans. The ICRG provides a numeric measure ( ) t ς ranging from 0 to 
6 with 0 signifying the most corrupt. This data base has monthly ratings for over 100 
countries dating back to 1984. It is used extensively for research in corruption, appearing 
recently in works by Knack and Keefer (1995), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997, 2000), 
Everhart and Sumlinski (2001), Knack (2001), and Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002), 
Abdiweli and Hodan (2003), Seldadyo and Haan (2006), among other. This database, as 
with most other sources of indices of corruption suffers from the risk that “experts” are 
biased in their opinions. Thus, while no index of corruption is perfect, we have chosen 
the one with the longest time series available on Lebanon, which is the ICRG index. 
Recall that the index of corruption in equation (1) is expressed asρ . We will 
convert the raw corruption data ( ) t ς from ICRG to an index ranging from “0” to “1” (the 
higher the index the higher the average corruption). As its proxy, the function 
()( 1 6 ) tt CORRUPTION ς ς =−         (34) 
will be used for two reasons. First  ( ) t CORRUPTION ς makes output a negative 
function of corruption. Second, since ( ) t ς is bounded by 0 and 6, therefore, 
() t CORRUPTION ς is bounded by 0 and 1. As a test of linearity of corruption, the 
corruption function will enter the production function both linearly and non-linearly. 
Therefore, ρ will take on two specific forms:  
(1 6) t CORRUPTION ς =−          (35) 
2 (1 6) t CORRUPTIONSQ ς =−         (36) 
The table below provides a list of the variables and parameters used in the 
analysis including their sources:   16
Table 2  Data description 
 
Variable name   Source  Description 
t ς  
ICRG – Compiled by Political Risk 
Services 
Average corruption from 1985-2006 for Lebanon. Corruption 
survey data ranging from “0” to “6”, where “6” relates to the least 
CORRUPTION   Derived using raw corruption variable, 
t ς  
Using equation 3.26, we convert raw corruption data to an index 
ranging from “0” to “1”. the higher the index the higher the 
CORRUPTIONSQ
 
Derived using raw corruption variable, 
t ς  
CORRUPTIONSQ=CORRUPTION*CORRUPTION 
GDP  IMF; Bank of Lebanon  Real per capita GDP at current prices in US Dollars 
INV  World Bank  Real investment share of GDP 
EDU  World Bank  Education expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
POP  Penn World Table (2006)  Population growth 
g  IMF; Bank of Lebanon  Government expenditure growth 
f  Lebanese Ministry of Finance  Foreign aid growth 
i  Lebanese Ministry of Finance  Investment growth 




Measuring corruption requires a model that pays special attention to the kind and 
level of corruption. Moreover, accurate data are needed to estimate any sophisticated 
model assessing the level of corruption. In this paper, we derived a model of corruption, 
using a Cobb-Douglas production function framework. Further, we identified the data 
sources, model extensions, limitations and estimation techniques. This model is to be 
tested empirically to trace the corruptive behaviour in Lebanon based on the available 
time-series data. The implications of the results for the further refinement of the model 
are yet to be explored.   17
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Appendix 
 





The economy begins with a corruption-free level of production and savings 
function as denoted by subscriptρ . As the level of corruption increases, the sustainable 
level of capital falls from k0 to k1 and output falls accordingly. Therefore, increases in 
corruption reduce economic growth and output per worker. 
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